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In this interest of time, I’ll just say something directly: this is an incredible book.
Reading it, thinking it through, is extremely rewarding. I haven’t read a work of
philosophy that had as much impact on me since being in school myself. The book
presents you with new ideas and connections and it forces you to see philosophy and its
history in new ways, even if you (like me) had been quite attached to your old ways. The
book got into my head. Now I find myself, in idle moments, arguing with Paul up there
in my head; as if there is a little copy of him in there now, making the case for his
versions of inferentialism and cognitive contextualism. Fortunately, Paul is in my
experience unfailingly nice, generous and sympathetic even in argument—otherwise it
might not be as nice to have a copy of him in your head. Still, the copy pales in
comparison to the original, so it is great to be here.
I can’t do justice to the book. But I will try to proceed as follows. I will try to sketch the
general line of thought I find so powerful. Then, I will try to take up my assigned role as
critic. The most stimulating thing I can think of to do is to argue as follows: Paul’s
arguments concerning Kant and Hegel are largely successful, but end up pushing us in
directions that are not consistent with the general approach to philosophy, and the
general approach to Kant and Hegel, from which Paul himself begins. So we should
abandon that general approach. That is what I will try, at least, to argue.
1. Redding’s Basic Story about Kant and Hegel
In thinking through the book, I’ve come to think that there is an important general
approach to philosophy that Paul shares with others, but which Paul is further
advancing here in fruitful and surprising directions all his own. It has come to seem
important to me to try to formulate the basic claim with which that approach begins. I’m
not sure how to precisely formulate the claim, and would love some help. But the idea is,
I think, that a problem concerning meaning, content and understanding is of
fundamental importance to philosophy. It is “fundamental” in that, if we ignore it in
pursuing some other project, we risk drawing on covert assumptions about meaning
that will be our undoing. I guess I’ll call this the “fundamentality of meaning” claim,
although I’d also love a better name. What is the basic problem? One formulation, from

Paul’s discussion of McDowell, is this: how can we [A1] “secure the ‘objective purport’ of
thought” (22)? Or, as Paul cites Brandom: how can we explain our understanding of
claims [A2] “without an ultimately circular appeal to semantic concepts such as
intentional content, concept-use, or the uptake of representational purport (treated as
an explanatory primitive)” (75-6).
With respect to Kant and Hegel, the general and initial interpretive claim (if I
understand it) is that they accept the fundamentality of meaning. So Kant and Hegel
themselves most fundamentally pursue accounts of the meaningfulness of our thought,
or its objective purport.[1] Further, each aims to make good on an anti-skeptical payoff
promised by that approach. Kant argues, for example, that the conditions of the
possibility of the meaningfulness of our concepts preclude Humean skepticism. But
Kant is also supposed to have his own problem in this regard. Kant remains a kind of
skeptic about our knowledge of things in themselves. And this is a mistake. The mistake
Kant makes is that Kant fails to subject his own theory of things in themselves to worries
concerning the most fundamental philosophical problem: the problem about meaning
or semantics. So Kant falls prey to the difficulties posed by those worries. In Paul’s
terms:
[B] …should not the idea of a conceivable but unknowable ‘thing-in-itself ’ be
regarded from the Kantian orientation as itself just as problematic as the
conception of it as knowable? Kant’s combination of conceivability but
unknowability seems to take away with the one hand a quasi-divine epistemic
take on the world – the so-called ‘God’s-eye view’ – only to return something like
a semantic version of it with the other (222)
So this is one respect in which Kant’s own basic project—read as Kant’s attempt to
account for the meaningfulness of thought—requires carrying further. And that is what
Hegel is trying to do. Hegel tries to [c] “restore substantive content to philosophy by
undermining that residually dogmatically metaphysical assumption responsible for
Kant’s apparent denial of it.” (222) And that is why Paul treats Hegel’s project as as an
extension of Kant’s own critical turn, or as “post-Kantian” (13).
What makes Paul’s further development of this general approach so successful and
powerful, to my mind, is that he doesn’t stall out or return us to where we were before
beginning to philosophize; he shows how a great many controversial and far-reaching
positive philosophical commitments follow in Kant and in Hegel. What’s really
interesting is that Reading shows how all too many commitments follow, in a sense,
insofar as some of them will conflict.
What are these commitments?
On the one hand, Kant begins and Hegel completes a line of thought similar to that later
explored by McDowell. To put it in contemporary terms: we must reject the myth of the
given in understanding perception. But we must also retain the role of perception in
securing the objective purport of our concepts. To do so, we must conclude that we have
direct experience of a world that is not beyond the conceptual. To my mind, Paul

renders this conclusion wonderfully clear and philosophically compelling by showing
that it is a revival of an Aristotelian conclusion: the objects we perceive are supposed to
be Aristotelian substances, not “bare pieces of ‘matter’” but rather “individual instances
of thing kinds.” (31) Paul argues that the roots of this line of thought are half anticipated
in Kant, at least in some of what Kant says about intuition. But Kant cannot carry
through because he operates with two different accounts of intuition. It is left to Hegel
to fully develop the Aristotelian conclusions, especially in the “Consciousness” section of
the Phenomenology.
On the other hand, Kant begins and Hegel completes another line of thought, similar to
that later explored in Brandom’s discussions of inferentialism. On Paul’s account,
inferentialism is also a response to a myth of the given—the myth of the “logical given.”
Russell and Moore fall prey to this myth just as Aristotle had: they hold a
representationalist view that cannot explain and so must just assume the
meaningfulness of logical categories:
[D] For Aristotle, it would seem, the categories reflected in the logical behaviour
of our words reflect structures properly belonging to being…
So for Russell… the laws of thought are made true by an ontology. (61)
Kant reverses this mistake: “for Kant the worldly structures – in the sense of the way
that they are for us – reflect the logical structures of our judgements” (61). And Paul
argues that Kant understands what it is to be a judgment in terms of what it is to be fit to
stand in larger explanatory inferences. This is what Paul calls the “Kantian source for
Hegel’s inferentialism.” Again, Hegel will carry to completion this line of thought, again
in his discussion of “Consciousness” in the Phenomenology.
But here comes a twist. Even this move away from Aristotle also depends on Aristotle.
Paul argues, as we’ve just heard, that Brandom’s inferentialism depends on Aristotle’s
term logic.[2] So far, then, the moral is shaping up to be something like this: Aristotle!
Can’t live with him, can’t live without him…
But note the wonderfully Hegelian manner in which at least one unified conclusion
already emerges from contradictory views: whichever way we go, there is nothing to be
said for Russell’s claim that Hegel’s philosophy is outdated because dependent on
outdated Aristotelian logic. In some senses, Hegel has excellent reasons for reviving
Aristotle—reasons that are in no sense outdated but play a big role in philosophy today.
In another sense, we do have reason to be suspicious of Aristotle. But this is, ironically,
reason to prefer Hegel to Russell! It is reason to prefer Hegel’s inferentialism to
Russell’s representationalist account of logical meaning. At this point, all I can do is
marvel at the elegance of the way in which the incredibly complex strands of Paul’s
argument come together here in a simple, beautiful result.
Coming back to Hegel, Paul argues that Hegel combines the contradictory pro-and antiAristotelian commitments. Hegel does so by means of a view that Paul labels “cognitive
contextualism.” The idea is that different forms of logic, and corresponding different

forms of negation, are appropriate in different contexts, or different cognitive
orientations.[3] But I will come back to this below.

II. Kant’s Epistemic Modesty
I find completely convincing what I take to be Paul’s central argument about Kant.
Kant’s faculty of the understanding is responsible for judgment. But it requires positive
guidance from the faculty of reason, which is responsible for forming larger inferences
in pursuit of explanations.
judgement forms are differentiated in terms of the way they function in forms of
explanation involving inferences (121)
So a judgment, Paul says, should be
[f] read as containing a syllogism which is made explicit in the explanation. All
this, I suggest, means that Kant gives a much more positive role to reason than is
traditionally acknowledged (122)
So the action of the Critique is located, more than we would expect from what Paul calls
“textbook” readings, in positive claims about the role of reason in the “Transcendental
Dialectic”.
But I think we’ve now jettisoned Paul’s own starting point. I take it that the faculty of
reason does its work by supplying us with ideas. In Kant’s terms, it most fundamentally
provides us with the idea of the unconditioned. Reason, then, directs us to seek to
explain things by seeking their underlying conditions. Ultimately, reason directs us to
aim for complete explanation by seeking underlying complete or total unconditioned
grounds.[4] Of course, Kant denies us knowledge of anything unconditioned.[5] Such
knowledge would be possible only without our dependence on sensible intuition, or only
with intellectual intuition, or only with a divine intellect in this sense. So principles from
our faculty of reason can be legitimate only in their role guiding our research, or only as
regulative principles. But we cannot claim knowledge that there must really exist for
everything conditioned some unconditioned ground. I take it that this is to say that we
cannot claim knowledge of the truth of the rationalists’ principle of sufficient reason.
Nor can we claim knowledge of any of the conclusions rationalists generate on the basis
of that principle—we cannot claim the rationalists’ knowledge of soul, cosmos, or
God.[6]
Things in themselves
But note that these resources of the Transcendental Dialectic account of reason,
emphasized by Paul himself, are precisely what allow Kant to operate with a conception
of something unknowable for us—something that could be known only from a divine
point of view.[7]

Granted, perhaps there is reason to worry about the intelligibility of idea of a “God’s eye
view” in the sense that seems to so worry Nietzsche (for example): the sense of a
perspective on things that takes no particular point of view on things at all. Perhaps
Nietzsche’s idea of a God’s eye view is incoherent. Perhaps it would make no sense to
desire such a point of view, nor to be disappointed to lack it. But Paul’s emphasis on
Kant’s Transcendental Dialectic and our pursuit of explanation leads us to the
conclusion that what Kant takes us to desire is something else—we desire completeness
of explanatory insight; that certainly seems intelligible to me; and Kant has wonderfully
principled reasons for thinking that we can’t get it.
By contrast, commitment to the fundamentality of problems concerning meaning
inclines Paul to worry that Kant should not allow a meaningful concept of anything
unknowable. Paul thinks that the same reasons Kant has for denying knowledge should
lead him to deny meaning or conceivability. Kant is supposed to illegitimately rely on a
“semantic version” of “the so-called ‘God’s-eye view’” and this is a “dogmatically
metaphysical assumption”.
It is here that Paul’s own success interpreting Kant leads me to conclude that we should
give up the idea that Kant is most fundamentally worried about explaining all meaning
or content or understanding. We can’t mistake this point once we follow Paul in
recognizing the importance of the account of the faculty of reason and explanation in the
Dialectic. Then we see that Kant’s central goal is to save what is worth saving but
otherwise to destroy rationalist metaphysics. Kant does so by arguing that the faculty of
reason provides us with meaningful ideas of goals that guide us in seeking explanation,
while our dependence on the faculty of sensibility blocks knowledge of whether
anything real corresponds to those ideas.
This project also structures much of Kant’s work back in Transcendental Aesthetic and
the Analytic, and provides a great deal of motivation for his distinctions between the
faculties of Sensibility, Understanding, and Reason. Kant must delicately show that
employing concepts of the Understanding without intuition from Sensibility leaves us
without a certain kind of meaning—meaning in the sense of a relation to a determinate
object with respect to which we could determine truth or falsity—it leaves us without
possibility of cognition and its relation to an objection, and so without theoretical
knowledge in any sense.[8] But Kant carefully allows that unschematized categories of
the Understanding can be employed with a kind of meaning beyond the limits of our
knowledge: [ j] ‘even after abstraction from every sensible condition’ the categories
retain ‘a logical significance’ (A147/B186). [k] And ‘the categories are not restricted in
thinking by the conditions of our sensible intuition, but have an unbounded field’
(B166n).[9] So [L] ‘I can think what I like, as long as I do not contradict myself”.[10]
If you instead leave us without any way to think of what we cannot know, then you are
not further advancing Kant’s epistemic modesty—you are destroying it. Philosophy has
been down that path before: Berkeley claims to be extending epistemic modesty into a
way of taking more seriously the modest doctrine of concept empiricism, until we realize
that we cannot even have a meaningful or coherent concept of an external material
object.[11] Presto: no more skepticism! But we should recognize Berkeley’s idealism

here as an ambitious metaphysical conclusion. That is fine, in my book. But we should
not be fooled into thinking that this is any way to further the cause of epistemic
modesty, or that it can be supported by the rejection of dogmatism; anyone truly aiming
for epistemic modesty—like Kant—will recoil in horror.
Granted, Kant cannot provide any further explanation of the meaning of the ideas of
reason. Reason provides meaningful ideas. Reason is spontaneous in this respect. End
of story, as far as I can see. But why should we mind that “end of story”? Kant does not
claim to explain the meaningfulness of the ideas beyond this point. And he does not
claim to give any kind of complete explanation of any and all meaning. Ideas like the
idea of the unconditioned do have meaning; now that positivism is behind us, would
anyone doubt it? Kant just takes this plainly accessible meaningful idea as basic, and
gets stunning results by doing so. Everyone must take something as basic, or given. I
cast my humble vote for restricting accusations of succumbing to myths of the given for
the very different case in which someone claims to explain some X and yet really
covertly assumes X as given—for example someone claims to explain meaning but does
not, or claims to explain epistemic justification but does not. If someone is instead
happy to take some kind of meaning as given but you don’t think that this should be
taken as given, then it seems to me you need a longer argument against them—perhaps
an argument for the premise of the fundamentality and unavoidability of problems
about meaning.[12] [13]
Further, what exactly could one charge that Kant is missing? Perhaps an explanation of
meaning in terms that do not presuppose meaning? Perhaps more specifically an
explanation of the normativity of meaning in non-normative terms? But can anyone do
that? My sense is that this would be very difficult. For everyone. If so, then everyone will
have to take meaning for granted at some point. I see no problem with Kant taking the
meaning of reason’s ideas for granted right away, and attacking the problems he finds
most pressing. [14]
We should not conclude from this that there is some deep tension or fault-line within
Kant’s philosophy. [e.g. Putnam in M] Obviously, if someone is fundamentally
concerned with explaining meaning or content, then they can look at Kant through that
lens, and they can find passages which fit with their concern and passages which do not.
But you could look at Kant through any number of lenses and find any number of
dividing lines. That’s no reason to think there is a fault-line intrinsic to Kant’s
philosophy.[15] We should instead conclude that Kant’s own fundamental philosophical
concern is not with explaining all possibility of meaning or content or understanding.
And, as far as I can see, there is no philosophical reason to think there is anything wrong
with Kant on this score.
In sum, Paul’s core case about Kant is entirely convincing. But I draw morals from it
that Paul probably won’t like. First, Kant does not succumb to a problem concerning
meaning. And Kant does not need completing in this respect—not by Hegel, nor by
contemporary philosophical accounts of meaning. And this seems to me an excellent
case in which attention to history can teach us important lessons about philosophy
generally. For I wonder, further, whether Kant’s successes in pursuit of his own

fundamental goals shouldn’t lead us to handle more skeptically the idea that
philosophical problems of meaning must always be unavoidably fundamental?
3. An Intolerable Oscillation
Now I think that much the same is true of Hegel: Paul’s core case concerning Hegel is
entirely convincing. But it forces us in the direction of rejecting the basic philosophical
approach with which Paul himself begins.
What I specifically find convincing is Paul’s account of Hegel as reviving aspects of
Aristotle’s metaphysics. This seems to me to fit Hegel like a glove. That is, I think that
Hegel takes the sciences to aim at knowledge of these kinds and the natural laws which
connect them in relations of material consequence and exclusion. (I like Brandom’s
examples: it is objectively necessary that pure copper melt at 1084° C., and impossible for a
mass to be accelerated without being subjected to some force.) I think that Hegel seeks to
argue that the kinds themselves naturally fall into different groups or levels. And Hegel’s
metaphysical project is this: he seeks to delineate these groups, and so to establish
conclusions about the structure of reality itself.
Further, as Paul notes, this line of thought brings out a solid contact between Hegel and
recent analytic philosophy: there has been a
[N] (a) revival of Aristotelian ideas within analytic philosophy in the final third of
the twentieth century. David Armstrong, for example, had reintroduced
universals into analytic metaphysics in a way that linked them to laws of nature
(44)
This line of thought brings us to more metaphysical questions: What are these natural
kinds? How do they relate to one another? Etc. As far as I can see, there is nothing
stopping us, at this point, from focusing our attention more directly on problems in
metaphysics, without any special constraint by philosophical considerations concerning
meaning.
But Paul seems to me to pull back here. He says that the line he is pursuing—he is
specifically talking about McDowell’s engagement with Evans—leads not to the sort of
Aristotelian metaphysics revived recently by Armstrong. It rather
(b) bears more of a family resemblance to the more explicitly Kant-oriented
version of essentialism found in the work of Hilary Putnam.72 Like Kant, Putnam
focuses upon the role played by the subjective conditions of determinacy that
allow our thoughts to have a content. (c) Like Aristotle, however, (and like Hegel)
Putnam thinks of the conceptual ‘kind’ structures that individual thought tracks
as ‘in the world’ rather than ‘in the head’.
But it seems to me that we are just moving in a circle here. Paul can’t sit still with the
Aristotelian metaphysics of (a), perhaps because it leaves the fundamentality of meaning
behind. So he turns to Kant and talk of subjective conditions as in (b). But he can’t sit

still here either. For this would now suggest that we are talking about our conceptual
scheme, as opposed to unknowable things in themselves. Paul’s focus on problems of
meaning leads him to think that this Kantian stance is incoherent. So he moves on to the
Aristotelian metaphysics of (c), which looks to me like moving back to (a). My worry is
that Paul’s initial focus on problems about meaning and content prevent him from going
in either direction, and force him to try to land somewhere in between. But I am not yet
convinced that there is a stable philosophical position in between. So this seems to me
like an intolerable oscillation.
But it seems to me easy to resolve the intolerable oscillation here. We need only drop the
idea that problems about meaning are somehow supposed to be so fundamental, and the
idea that Kant and Hegel agree and so are most fundamentally trying to explaining
meaning. I have already explained why I think that dropping this allows us to better
appreciate Kant’s philosophical aims and advantages.
Now I will turn to make a similar case with respect to Hegel’s very different
philosophical project, and its very different and competing philosophical advantages.
IV. Hegel’s Metaphysics
First of all, I don’t think that Hegel’s pursuit of metaphysical questions need fall prey to
any epistemological or semantic myths of the given.[16][17] The reasons are the same as
those given above: it is not clear to me that there is anything wrong with taking the
meaning of our meaningful words as given, and then using them to try to answer
metaphysical questions. As least not as long as we lack an a priori reason for thinking
that metaphysics should be held hostage to either epistemology or semantics, or cannot
begin until the later are complete. Certainly Hegel does not think that we need be held
hostage in this way. He recognizes that some would want to delay our seeking
metaphysical knowledge of e.g. “the essence of things.” They would have us delay until
we have knowledge of our own “faculty of cognition”. Hegel rejects the insistence on
understanding our cognition before addressing the metaphysical questions such as
those concerning the essence of things: to urge to delay is like what Hegel calls [o] “the
wise resolve of Scholasticus to learn to swim before he ventured in the water”
(§10An).[18],[19] I take the moral to be that we should address more directly
metaphysical questions and concerns, such as those concerning the essence of things.
Convinced as I am by Paul’s case about Hegel’s commitment to revive aspects of
Aristotle’s metaphysics, I find myself with worries about each of Paul’s account of both
of his two cognitive orientations. First, Paul argues that, to deal with problems
concerning the perceptual given, something like Aristotle’s forms or thing-kinds are
supposed to play a direct role in perception. But Paul also worries about the idea of a
[P] world of self-subsistent substances or things-in-themselves … somehow
unproblematically epistemically presented to a subject before whom they stand
(Aristotle)[20]

I’m happy to go along with Paul’s worry. But the worry does not concern any part of the
metaphysics of Aristotelian kinds. The worry concerns an epistemological claim about
the role of those kinds in perception. The worry concerns the claim that natural kinds
are in perception “epistemically presented to a subject.” It seems to me that this is an
epistemological claim that Hegel emphatically denies. Hegel denies that natural kinds
show up directly in perception. For example:
[R] The universal does not exist externally to the outward eye as universal. The
kind as kind cannot be perceived: the laws of celestial motion are not written in
the sky. (§21Z)
Rather, we seek explanatory knowledge by thinking about what we observe, and drawing
inferences about the natural laws and kinds which explain our observations.[21] So I
didn’t understand why Paul so closely associated the Aristotelian metaphysics with the
difficulties encountered in the “Perception” section in the Phenomenology. I don’t see
that any worries about perception (or any worries about semantics or epistemology at
all) in any way qualify Hegel’s commitment to the metaphysical claim for the reality of
the natural kinds.
Paul’s other cognitive orientation is, I think, a form of holism. It seems to me that a
wonderful payoff of Paul’s case concerning Hegel and Aristotle is that we need not read
Hegel’s holism as an attempt to account for meaning or content. We can read it rather as
a claim about the natural kinds. So Hegel will argue, especially in the “Reason” section
of the Phenomenology, that the very nature of the sort of natural kind that figure in the
laws of nature will depend on its relations to others in laws—and so on the whole
network of laws and kinds. What it is to be acidic, for example, depends on how acids
react with bases. For example, the relation between acids and bases, that ‘they are only
this relation’ (Phän 3:195/153).[22][23]
Now clearly there is something disturbing about this holism. To be any particular node
just is to stand in certain relations to others. But, if so, then we independently say what
it is that really stands in those relations! Perhaps if this were a theory attempting to
explain meaning, then this problem would show it to be an incomplete theory.
But once I buy Paul’s connection between Hegel and Aristotle, then I’m going to want to
see this holism as metaphysics. (Perhaps Betrand Russell thought that things couldn’t
possibly be like this—they couldn’t possibly be the “bowl of jelly” Brandom referred to.
But I see no reason to think Hegel would have to agree. I think Hegel argues that SOME things
are disturbingly gelatinous. This holism) is supposed to be a correct account specifically of
the lower-levels of nature—of the natural kinds that figure in exceptionless laws of
nature. This is disturbing, to be sure. But what is disturbing here is not a theory,
whether a theory of meaning or of anything else. Rather, the things themselves are
disturbingly insubstantial or gelatinous. There is something confounding and even
contradictory about the lower-levels of nature themselves.[24] On the lower levels,
everything is dependent. But to say this is to imply that there is ultimately something—
some substantial individuals or a substantial whole—that is independent enough for
other things to depend on it. But the implication is contradicted by the lack of anything

independently substantial upon which things on this level depend. The parts or notes
depend on one another within a whole network, [V] so that the concept or “Begriff of the
whole” is “the real kind of the particular object”; but this whole itself merely
presupposes the differentiated kinds, or depends on their differentiation as a kind of
posit: “the chemical object … is thus the contradiction of its immediate positedness and
its immanent individual concept” (WL 4:430/728).
So once I buy Paul’s argument about Hegel and Aristotle, this seems to me to send us
toward a very different account of Hegel’s view of the contradiction in things. A payoff of
this approach is that it captures a very different sense in which Hegel is furthering
Kant’s critical turn against rationalist metaphysics. Rationalists find the apparent lack
of substantiality in nature as reason to think that there must be some hidden deeper
substance on which things depend. So rationalists assert that the true substance of
things is hidden; it could be best appreciated by a deeper insight, a divine perspective.
Kant preserves rationalist ideas about the sort of insight we seek, but Kant much more
rigorously denies us access to knowledge, concluding that we cannot know whether
there is any hidden substantiality to things beyond surprisingly insubstantial matter in
space, consisting [x, y] “wholly of relations.”[25] Hegel has a very different way of
leaving pre-critical rationalism behind. Hegel asserts knowledge that there is not any
deeper substance to the lower levels of nature: they are confoundingly insubstantial,
even though this and amounts to a kind of real contradiction; reason can be satisfied
only by the substance of higher-level phenomena: partly by consideration of natural
teleological phenomena in biology. But only Geist is truly substance. The whole of
everything is not substance, insofar as nature is progressively less and less substantial as
one descends.[26]
Paul ends up in a different position. His Hegel embraces two contradictory orientations,
and this means that everything in the world turns out to be contradictory. One way Paul
has of trying to explain this conclusion is to say that there is after all substance to the
world. But not anything akin to Aristotle’s finite substances as stable substrates of
change. Rather, there is the substance of something like Aristotle’s divine mind thinking
itself, something which does not lack “the principles of ‘life’ and ‘subjectivity.’” Another
way is to say that the world is such that we cannot entirely state, from the perspective of
either available cognitive orientation, what is the case in the world. The world is rather
what shows itself in our thought, even as this is shot through as this is with
contradiction. Our grasp of the world as a whole is akin to what Wittgenstein calls “the
mystical.” But the moral is supposed to be not that we should, with Wittgenstein, remain
silent. Rather: [Z] “Hegel was committed to the project of rendering the whole ‘felt’ in
mystical experience explicit.”
But if there is no way to overcome the contradiction between cognitive orientations,
then this would mean that we must strive infinitely to make explicit what cannot ever be
made explicit. That’s an interesting view, but it doesn’t seem to me Hegelian. (It seems
like the sort of “bad infinite” that Brandom mentions and associates with Fichte.)
Further, this kind of view seems to me to result in a position similar to those of Hegel’s
contemporaries who Hegel sees as trying to revive rationalist metaphysics and combine

it with mysticism. They argue that there is deeper substance to the whole of everything,
even if we cannot grasp it in finite, rational thinking—perhaps because it is alive, or
moving, or self-conscious, or self-contradictory, etc. But Hegel seems to me to excoriate
such views. His comment on Schelling[27] is typical: “One wants, if one philosophizes, to
have proven that it is so”; but with Schelling’s appeal to intellectual intuition of the
whole, “the proving of anything, the making it comprehensible, is thus abandoned.”[28]
I wasn’t sure, but wanted to ask, how Paul’s “felt” mystical grasp of the world was
supposed to differ on this score.[29]

In sum, I find myself completely convinced by what I take to be Paul’s core arguments
concerning Kant and Hegel. But I draw morals that I don’t think Paul will like. I think
that both core arguments require us to give up the basic approach with which Paul
begins—to give up the fundamentality of problems concerning meaning. Doing so allows
us to better appreciate Kant and Hegel’s very different positions, and the very different
advantages of each. It allows us to appreciate Kant’s prescription of epistemic modesty
as the antidote to rationalism, even though this turns on taking the meanings of some
ideas as basic or given. And it allows us to appreciate Hegel’s very different attempt to
defend a metaphysics that is flatly, and radically different than the rationalists’. It also
allows us to appreciate the direct connection between Hegel and the current focus in
analytic philosophy on metaphysics.
Probably I have much of this wrong, but I do hope that it is wrong in a way that
stimulates discussion. I hope, that is, that I could stimulate debate by explaining to how
from Paul’s book I learned a contrarian lesson: how to worry less about meaning and
love both Kant’s epistemic modesty and also Hegel’s metaphysics.

End

[1] So the idea will be that Kant’s basic goal, in distinguishing concept from intuition, is to account for
how it is that our judgments have objective purport, and how that meaning is grounded in experience in
some way. If the concept/intuition distinction cannot do that, then it will fail to meet its goal. If Hegel can
do better here, then he will have good claim to be completing Kant’s critical philosophy if he aims to do
better in this respect, and succeeds.

[2]This poses a difficulty for Brandom’s later development of inferentialism. Brandom leans on ideas
similar to Hegel’s “determinate negation” in articulating his claims about relations of material
consequence and incompatibility. And Paul argues that this idea from Hegel, and inferentialism itself,
relies on more Aristotelian views. It depends “on features of Aristotelian logic that have no simple
equivalent in the Fregean logic that Brandom endorses.” Brandom needs the “mutually excluding
contraries of Aristotle’s term logic to capture the type of entailment relations that fit his inferentialist
account. On asserting that an object is blue all over, for example, we commit ourselves to the further
assertion that it is not red all over”(83). And Paul extends from here to argue that Brandom cannot have
an Aristotle-free alternative to McDowell’s account of perception: even Brandom’s appeal to the idea of
reliable discrimination presupposes objects that are Aristotelian substances: objects of some kind that
cannot admit contrary properties.
[3] In line with what I have called his cognitive contextualism, Hegel regarded term negation as
appropriate in particular contexts and inappropriate in others

[4] : “the proper principle of reason in general … is to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions
of the understanding” (A307/B364).

[5] For he denies that we can have knowledge of anything unconditioned: knowledge requires intuition;
in our case that means intuition from sensibility; and the forms of our sensibility, space and time, will
prevent knowledge of anything unconditioned “in sensibility, i.e. in space and time, every condition to
which we can attain in the exposition of given appearances is in turn conditioned” (A508/B536).

[6] For example, this principle is the ground on which the ‘the entire antinomy of pure reason rests’: ‘If
the conditioned is given, then the whole series of all conditions for it is also given’ (A497/B525). And this
principle is a version of the principle of sufficient reason: for anything that is not a sufficient reason for
itself, or for anything conditioned, there must be a complete series of conditions that provides for it a
sufficient reason.

[7] As Kant says in the B-preface summary of the main argument of the Critique: That which necessarily
drives us to go beyond the boundaries of experience and all appearances is the unconditioned, which
reason necessarily and with every right demands in things themselves for everything that is conditioned.
(Bxx)

[8] : “all significance (Bedeutung), i.e., relation to the object, disappears” (A241/B300).
[9] Adams (1997: 807-8); also Clark (1985). Kant does say that merely ‘intelligible objects … without any
schema of sensibility’ are ‘impossible’ (A286/B342). But even right here he continues to introduce a sense
of noumenon that is ‘problematic’ in this sense: it is a ‘representation of a thing of which we can say
neither that it is possible nor that it is impossible’ (A286-7/B343).

[10] Bxxvi note. Some ideas of unknowable objects generate contradictions. But it is crucial to Kant’s
project, as he emphasizes, that this claim is restricted to the ideas of the spatio-temporal world as a
completed, unconditioned whole: ‘The first two antinomies … are founded on such a contradictory
concept’ (P 4:341). That claim does not apply to the ideas central to the second two antinomies. Nor does
it apply to psychological and theological ideas (A673/B701).

[11] it is plain that the very notion of what is called matter, or corporeal substance, involves a
contradiction in it. (472)
[12] Consider Sellars on the myth of the given. I take it that his central targets are those who specifically
seek to provide an explanation of epistemological support or justification. They succumb to the myth of
the given insofar as they appeal to given sense-data that cannot play the role of justifying—so they have to
smuggle in the justification without explaining it. Perhaps there is an analogous myth of the given with
respect to meaning rather than epistemology. To succumb to this myth would be to aim to explain how
meaning is possible, while illegitimately smuggling meaning in without explaining it. That would be bad, I
agree. But I don’t see Kant succumbing to this problem.

[13] Obviously, if we think of a concept empiricist, she would be unhappy with Kant’s position. She would
demand a further explanation of the meaning of reason’s idea of the unconditioned. But it is equally
obvious that a concept empiricist won’t be able to preserve what Kant thinks he needs saving from
rationalism: the guiding role of reason and of the idea which “necessarily drives us to go beyond the
boundaries of experience.” And Redding is right that this guiding role is crucially important in Kant.

[14] Furthermore, say a doctrine like concept empiricism threatens to show that concepts like Kant’s
concept of the unconditioned cannot have any meaning. It seems to me clear that I do have a meaningful
concept here. As it has seemed to many philosophers concerned with such issues. My grasp on this
meaning seems much more secure than my grasp on why I should buy anything like concept empiricism.
Excellent reason, then, to reject such doctrines. A Moorean response to semantic skepticism!

[15] E.g. Putnam: ‘Kant has, in a way, two philosophies’, because sometimes Kant claims that ‘we cannot
really form any intelligible notion of a noumenal thing’ and yet sometimes Kant claims that ‘there is God,
Freedom and Immortality’ in a real ‘noumenal’ world (1987: 41-2). It seems clear to me that Kant’s goal is
a single consistent philosophy that fits neither view seen by Putnam: we must conceive of God, Freedom
and Immortality; but we cannot have theoretical knowledge of whether there are such things.

[16] Perhaps one could charge me at some particular point in my metaphysical project with making a
specific claim without explaining how that claim could possibly be known to be true. That can certainly be
fair. But much hinges here on more specific characterization of the epistemological challenge. Critics tend
to help themselves to really powerful challenges. For example, I prefer a recently popular and
metaphysically robust account of the laws of nature, which Redding mentions and notes as another form
of the re-emergence of Aristotle’s influence in philosophy. I think that there are laws of nature, and that
these determine what can and cannot happen, thus determining the regularities. So I do not think that
laws are regularities. It is sometimes said that the regularity view enjoys an epistemological advantage,
but this seems unproven to me. Granted, I have no argument that would defeat Cartesian skepticism and
show that we can have knowledge that there are such robust laws of nature. But by that standard our
knowledge of regularities will be in severe trouble as well. Even our knowledge of the external world will
be in trouble! You can try to deploy here inference to the best explanation (IBE) and claim that external
objects are the best explanation of our experience. I doubt this really helps with full-blown Cartesian
skepticism. But it is fine with me nonetheless, since all I claim to be doing is inferring to the existence of
Aristotelian laws of nature are the best explanation of our observed regularities. In any case, my interest
remains in which metaphysical claims are the best. If a particular epistemological standard looks to make
things equally troubling either way, then epistemology doesn’t promise to tell me what I want to know, so
I’ll feel fine about looking away from epistemology and back to metaphysics.

[17] Perhaps instead the worry is that my metaphysics might not include the elements necessary to
explain the meaningfulness of our concepts. But what is the specific challenge here? Perhaps the challenge
is that my metaphysics might not include the elements that would allow us to explain the normatively of
meaning in non-normative terms. But can anyone explain this? Until someone pulls it off, we are all going
to be taking meaning or something like it as given—at least at some point. This is great for me: I take it as
given at the beginning. I have concepts. I take them to be meaningful, as they seem to be. And I
immediately set to work using my concepts to pursue the problems that I take to be most pressing, along
with the many in the history of philosophy: the problems of metaphysics.

[18] Granted, I think this aspect of Hegel’s project is much more clearly reflected in the organization of
his later system, and there is much debate about the relation of this system to the earlier Phenomenology
of Spirit—the text preferred by Redding. Still, the Phenomenology too seems to me clearly about
metaphysics—about the nature of reality. Somewhere in the transition from “Consciousness” to “Selfconsciousness” we move from the conclusion that an independently active subject is required for there to
be any knowledge, and into metaphysical consideration of whether there is anything independently active
in the world—and what such a thing would have to be like, and how it would relate to other things.
[19]And Hegel recognizes that the use of epistemological and semantic arguments against metaphysical
views is often mere pretense. Empiricists, for example, may attack claims about necessary connections in
nature: epistemological attacks would deny us knowledge of whether such claims are true; semantic
attacks would deny that we can even have a meaningful concept of necessary connection. But Hegel sees
the real motive here as a preference for one kind of metaphysics over another. Empiricists prefer a
metaphysics in which everything is loose and separate, as Hume says. A metaphysics according to which
there are only things that are entangled in no necessary connections, such as “alterations that follow one
after the other” and “objects that lie side by side” (§39). Hegel suspects, and I agree, that empiricist
epistemology and semantics won’t really justify the former over the latter. So where empiricism attacks
the metaphysics, but it does so “without knowing that it thereby itself contains a metaphysics” (§38An). I
take the moral to be that we should bypass the pretense and more directly address the question of which
metaphysics is better. And yet, it might be objected, particular metaphysical commitments can
nevertheless still be discerned within the philosophy that characteristically develops along with this
displacement – epistemology – especially when tied to conceptions of ‘the given’.

[20] And Redding thinks that Hegel sees the need for another cognitive orientation: the more reflective
orientation characteristic of the sciences and that he calls ‘the Understanding’ [Verstand].
[21]in thinking about things, we always seek what is fixed, persisting and inwardly determined, and what
governs the particular” (§21Zu). What does govern the particular? Universal laws and kinds: The
empirical sciences do not stop at the perception of single instances of appearance; but through thinking
they have prepared the material for philosophy by finding universal determinations, kinds, and laws
(§12An).

[22] ‘the chemical object is not comprehensible from itself alone, and the being of one is the being of the
other’ (WL 6:430/728). And this will mean that the ‘being’ of such a kind will depend on the whole
interconnected network of kinds and laws within which it is a part. In Hegel’s terms, on this level of
nature the ‘determinateness’ of anything in particular ‘is the concrete moment of the individual concept
[Begriff] of the whole, which Begriff is the universal essence, the real kind [Gattung] of the particular
object’ (WL 6:430/728).

[23] Wherever we come to basic kinds and laws—although we may now think that these kinds are much
lower-level kinds—Hegel’s claim is that we will here find kinds that depend on one another: what it is to
be an election is to react in certain ways with protons. Or some yet lower-level story.

[24] We can observe an instance of some physical kind—some acid, for example—and it certainly seems
independently substantial. But when we seek to understand what it is we are observing, we find
something confusing: it ‘gets lost’ in its relations with others, or dissolved into chains of dependence; it
‘becomes something else than it is empirically, confuses cognition’ (Phän 3:190/149).

[25] All that we know in matter is merely relations (what we call the inner determinations of it are inward
only in a comparative sense) … It is certainly startling to hear that a thing is to be taken as consisting
wholly of relations. Such a thing is, however, mere appearance (A285/B341) “substantia phaenomenon
in space; its inner determinations are nothing but relations, and it itself is entirely made up of mere
relations…” (A266/B322)

[26] (This is a claim for a priority of Geist or spirit over nature. But we don’t need to read it as a claim for
the philosophical priority of problems concerning meaning over metaphysical problems concerning the
nature of natural kinds and the like. Rather, the priority claim is part of Hegel’s metaphysics. It is a claim
that the kind of thing that understands meaning, the kind of thing that we are, is in a respect higher or
more fundamental than the kind of things that does not, like copper, which just melts at a certain
temperature but doesn’t and cannot understand why. Our kind is prior in that it is more independently
substantial that the kinds that “get lost” in non-terminating chains of dependence.
[27] , or at least on Schelling as he interprets Schelling,
[28] VGP 20:434-5/3:525. On this line of argument see Westphal 1989a and 2000.
[29] In any case, it seems to me that, sooner or later, one must recognize Hegel’s metaphysics. If we read
his arguments along the way as addressed to problems concerning meaning, then when we turn to the
metaphysics we will find a kind of leap beyond the arguments—just the kind of thing Hegel himself
complains about. But the remedy is to recognize that the arguments were, from the beginning, more focus
on metaphysics than meaning. Then we can recognize that Hegel is doing what he tells us he is doing:
embracing Kant’s critical turn, but reacting to it by arguing for a very different kind of metaphysics.

